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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ERRED BY REFUSING TO ALLOW 
PETITIONER TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE OF HER POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION 
RESULTS, AND BY REFUSING TO ALLOW POLYGRAPH EXAMINERS TO 
TESTIFY BEFORE THE BOARD. 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act confers an express 
grant of discretion to admit or exclude evidence that is 
irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious. Section 63-46b-
8(1)(b)(1). Therefore, deference should be given to an ALJ's 
exclusion of evidence, and the decision of the agency unless its 
determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality. 
Johnson-Bowles v. Division of Securities, 829 P.2d 101, 108 (Utah 
App. 1992), quoting Pro-Bennett Staffing v. Board of Review, 775 
P.2d 439, 442 (Utah App. 1989). 
2. THE RECORD AS A WHOLE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT 
LICENSEE ENGAGED IN SEXUAL CONDUCT WITH K.G. IN 1985. 
In Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63 
(Utah App. 1991) , this Court held that a party challenging the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings, must 
demonstrate that the findings are not supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the Court. 
Id. at 67; See also. Section 63-46b-16(4)(g). 
To establish that the evidence is insufficient to support 
the findings, a party must marshall the evidence in support of the 
findings, and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the 
findings are not adequately supported. Heinecke v. Department of 
Commerce, 158 UAR 55, 57 (Utah App. 1981), quoting Mountain States 
Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah App,. 1989). 
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3. THE CONDUCT OF LICENSEE WHICH IS SUPPORTED BY THE 
RECORD AS A WHOLE DOES NOT JUSTIFY THE HARSH SANCTIONS 
IMPOSED BY THE DIVISION. 
The Division has a statutory grant of discretion to 
impose sanctions against licensees for violations of the rules 
governing the profession. Accordingly, this court will not disturb 
the agency's decision unless it is clearly unreasonable or 
otherwise an abuse of that discretion. Johnson-Bowles v. Division 
of Securities. 829 P.2d 101, 116 (Utah App. 1992). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Section 63-46b-8, UTAH CODE ANN. (1989). 
Except as provided in Subsections 63-46b-3(d)(i) and (ii), 
in all adjudicative proceedings, a hearing shall be conducted 
as follows: 
(b) On his own Motion or upon objection by a party, 
the presiding officer: 
(i) may exclude evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial, 
or unduly repetitious. 
Section 58-35-11, UTAH CODE ANN. (1990). 
The Division may refuse to renew, or may suspend or revoke any 
license issued under this chapter upon proof, after a hearing, 
that the licensee engaged in unprofessional conduct. 
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POINT 1 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ERRED BY REFUSING TO ALLOW PETITIONER 
TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE OF HER POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION RESULTS, AND BY 
REFUSING TO ALLOW POLYGRAPH EXAMINERS TO TESTIFY BEFORE THE BOARD. 
Licensee asserts that the Administrative Law Judge erred by 
refusing to allow her to introduce evidence of polygrciph results, 
and by refusing to allow polygraph examiners to testify before the 
Board. 
Section 63-46b-8(1)(b), UTAH CODE ANN., provides that the 
presiding officer may exclude evidence that is irrelevant, 
immaterial, or unduly repetitious. Relying on this authority, the 
Administrative Law Judge granted the Division's motion to exclude 
all polygraph evidence. 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act confers an express 
grant of discretion to admit or exclude evidence that is 
irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious. Section 63-46b-
8(1)(b)(1). Due to this grant of discretion, deference should be 
given to an ALJ's exclusion of evidence, and to the decision of the 
agency, unless its determination exceeds the bounds of 
reasonableness and rationality. Johnson-Bowles v. Division of 
Securities, 829 P.2d 101, 108 (Utah App. 1992), quoting Pro-Bennett 
Staffing v. Board of Review, 775 P.2d 439, 442 (Utah App. 1989). 
In this case, the ruling to exclude the polygraph evidence 
prohibited any mention by her witnesses and counsel concerning the 
polygraph examination or the results of that examination; precluded 
the polygraph examiners from testifying in this matter; and 
4 
excluded any and all exhibits which would mention the polygraph 
examination or the results. (R. at 448). The evidence was excluded 
by the ALJ without any regard to foundation for assessing the 
reliability and probative value of the polygraph examination. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the strict rules as to 
the admissibility of evidence are somewhat relaxed in 
administrative hearings. State Dep't of Community Affairs v. Utah 
Merit System Council, 614 P.2d 1259, 1262 (Utah 1980). Petitioner 
asserts that this ruling excluding this evidence was unreasonable 
and irrational, and is not consistent with the relaxed rules of 
evidence that apply at administrative hearings. In light of this 
relaxed standard, petitioner contends that to deny her the 
opportunity to introduce the polygraph evidence is unreasonable and 
prejudicial. This is particularly true when other evidence 
(i.e.hearsay) which would not be allowed in trial courts was 
admitted in the hearing. 
It is clear that polygraph examination results may be admitted 
into evidence when there is a valid stipulation between the 
parties. State v. Abel, 600 P.2d 994, 998 (Utah 1979). The Court 
in Abel expressly left open the question of whether polygraph 
results may be admitted in the absence of a stipulation. 
Licensee urges this court to rule that if the conditions 
required in State v. Rebetrano, 681 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1984), for 
admission of stipulated polygraph results in trial courts are met, 
then the results should be admitted into evidence without a 
stipulation in administrative hearings. First, participation in 
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the examination must be free and voluntary. The ALJ must be 
allowed to exclude evidence if the examiner was not qualified, or 
if the conditions under which the test was administered were 
unfair. The party opposing the evidence must also be allowed to 
cross examine the examiner as to his expertise; the reliability of 
polygraph examinations; and the accuracy of the apparatus used. 
The trier of fact should also be instructed that the examiners 
opinion is not conclusive, but is only to be taken as an opinion. 
Id. at 12 68. If these conditions are met, a licensee should be 
allowed to introduce the results of the polygraph examination in an 
administrative hearing, even in the absence of a stipulation. 
The Division argues in its brief that there is no reason for 
polygraph results to be admitted at administrative hearings in the 
absence of a stipulation. The reasoning of the Division is that 
polygraph evidence is not more reliable in an administrative 
proceeding than in a trial court. However, hearsay and other forms 
of evidence that might be inadmissible in a court of law may be 
considered during an administrative hearing. Tolman v. Salt Lake 
County Attorney. 818 P.2d 23, 29 (Utah App. 1991). Licensee 
submits that these forms of evidence are not more reliable in a 
court of law than they are in an administrative proceeding. The 
administrative hearing is the most appropriate forum for admission 
of polygraph evidence (or at least consideration of admission 
following foundational testimony) due to the less formal rules 
governing these hearings. 
The Division has argued in its brief that Nelson cannot argue 
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that the exclusion of polygraph evidence was prejudicial to her 
because that evidence is not part of the record. The Division 
reasons that this court could not determine whether Nelson suffered 
substantial prejudice even upon concluding that the polygraph 
results should have been admitted in the administrative hearing. 
Licensee asserts that the proffer of the evidence in this case was 
sufficient. 
In her response to the Division's motion to exclude this 
evidence, Nelson states that the polygraph examination corroborated 
her testimony that she did not have a sexual relationship with 
Griffith in 1985. (R.at 390). Nelson also proffered that the 
polygraph examiners were experienced members of the Salt Lake 
County Sheriff's office who had conducted many examinations and 
have testified in court regarding their examination which they had 
preformed. Nelson also offered to submit affidavits as to the 
credentials of the examiners used, and further proffered that the 
polygraph examination was professionally done and the results 
accurate. (R.at 390). 
The division has also argued that Nelson cannot show she was 
substantially prejudiced by the exclusion of the polygraph 
evidence. Nelson asserts that the prejudice she suffered as a 
result of the exclusion of the polygraph evidence is clear. 
First and foremost, it must be remembered that only Nelson and 
Griffith know whether they engaged in sexual activity while in 
Hawaii. Griffith testified that the activity did take place; 
Nelson testified that the activity did not take place. 
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Nelson maintains that the Administrative Law Judge's refusal 
to allow the polygraph evidence denied her the opportunity to 
corroborate the veracity of her statements. 
POINT II 
THE RECORD AS A WHOLE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT 
LICENSEE ENGAGED IN SEXUAL CONDUCT WITH K.G. IN 1985. 
In its brief, the Division has asserted that Nelson is barred 
from challenging the Findings, because Nelson did not marshall the 
evidence which supports the finding. Nelson asserts that she did 
indeed marshall the evidence which supports the division's finding, 
but argues that the evidence, when marshalled, does not support the 
finding. 
In Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P. 2d 63 (Utah 
App. 1991) , this Court held that a party challenging the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings, must 
demonstrate that the findings are not supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the Court. 
Id. at 67; See also. Section 63-46b-16(4)(g). 
To establish that the evidence is insufficient to support 
the findings, a party must marshall the evidence in support of the 
findings, and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the 
findings are not adequately supported. Heinecke v. Department of 
Commerce, 158 UAR 55, 57 (Utah App. 1981), quoting Mountain States 
Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah App,. 1989). 
The Division, in attempting to show that Nelson did not 
marshall the evidence which supports the finding of a sexual 
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relationship in 1985, points to the testimony of Griffith's brother 
and of his ex-wife. (Brief of R. page 29.) This "evidence" is that 
these individuals testified that Griffith told them that he had a 
sexual relationship with the therapist. Nelson included this 
information in her brief. (Brief of petitioner p.17). The 
testimony of Kathy Lavatt was identical; that is to say she 
testified to what Griffith had told her. 
The division also points to the testimony of witness Carlton 
Stubing in attempting to show that Nelson did not marshall the 
evidence which supported the decision. The statement of witness 
Stubing was that Nelson told her that she had some fear of 
abandonment that had been based on a past relationship Griffith. 
(Tr. at 484) This statement was reportedly made by Nelson to 
witness Stubing in 1989. 
The Division also argues that the letters written by Nelson to 
Griffith in 1988 corroborate the fact that sexual relations 
occurred between them in 1985. (Brief of R. at 30). The Division 
draws this conclusion from the following excerpt: Although I have 
many more feelings and thoughts about our "relationship" I just 
couldn't bring myself to risk by expressing them. Licensee submits 
that neither this letter, nor any other letter introduced, 
corroborates that sexual activity occurred between Nelson and 
Griffith in 1985. 
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In its Findings of Fact and Recommended Order, the Board 
determined that Licensee and K.G. engaged in sexual activity while 
in Hawaii in September, 1985, and found that Licensee had not 
properly terminated the client/therapist relationship at that time. 
The basis for finding that Licensee and K.G. engaged in sexual 
conduct while in Hawaii in 1985 comes from the testimony of K.G. 
Licensee contends that this testimony is false and incredible. 
Indeed, the Board in Finding of Fact #16 determined that 
there is a lack of credible evidence to find that the conduct took 
place as specifically described by K.G. during the instant 
proceeding. (R. at 71) . By finding that there is a lack of 
credible evidence to believe that the conduct took place as 
described by K.G., the Board chose not to believe the particulars 
of his testimony on this issue. 
Licensee contends that as the board clearly did not 
believe this portion of K.G.'s testimony, and thcit there is no 
credible evidence upon which to base the finding that the activity 
occurred. 
As the Board explicitly rejected K.G.'s specific 
rendition of the alleged sexual activity in Hawaii in 1985, this 
Court should find that this finding is not supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court. 
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POINT III 
THE CONDUCT OF LICENSEE WHICH IS SUPPORTED BY THE 
RECORD AS A WHOLE DOES NOT JUSTIFY THE HARSH SANCTIONS 
IMPOSED BY THE DIVISION. 
The Division has a statutory grant of discretion to 
impose sanctions against licensees for violations of the rules 
governing the profession. Accordingly, this court will not disturb 
the agency's decision unless it is clearly unreasonable or 
otherwise an abuse of that discretion. Johnson-Bowles v. Division 
of Securities. 829 P.2d 101, 116 (Utah App. 1992). 
Despite the fact that the Division has broad discretion, 
reason dictates that the most severe sanctions of revocation or 
suspension of a professional license should be reserved for the 
most serious breaches of ethical conduct. 
In its brief, the Division asserts that the non-sex related 
violations were just as serious as the violation of the rule 
prohibiting sexual relations with a client. (Respondent's Brief at 
31) . While it is true that the Division found the nature of the 
bartering agreement between Nelson and Griffith to be unethical, it 
can hardly be maintained that the non-sexual violations warrant 
suspension of the licenses. 
Licensee contends that the suspension or revocation of 
licenses should be reserved for the most serious violations of the 
ethical standards of the profession. Licensee exercised poor 
judgment with regard to Griffith, but as the sexual conduct is 
insufficient to justify the finding that a sexual relationship 
occurred in Hawaii in 1985, her licenses should not be suspended 
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nor should she be restricted from private practice of social 
work. 
CONCLUSION 
Licensee urges this court to overturn the portion of the Order 
suspending her licenses, and barring her from the private practice 
of social work. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / / day of June, 1993. 
N. PAPPAS ^ /J7/ 
torney for Petitioner 
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